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THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MARGINAL SEA

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MARGINAL SEA
JAMES MUNRO*

The Supreme Court of the United States, for all its cloistered
remoteness, must at times descend into the market place there to deal
with highly charged controversies. One case having its just share of
fissionable stuff was that of United States v. California, decided in
June of 1947.1 The pressure built up by the oil-tidelands states, particularly California and Texas, was released with an awesome detonation, still reverberating. Comment has been, as is usual in such cases,
restrained and otherwise.2
Legally the argument has been that the states rightfully owned
the lands in question and that there was no justification for the Federal
government to assert "paramount rights" in the marginal belt. From
there the transition has been easy to the argument that, under the
rationale of the California case, the United States can take, without
compensation, land and minerals wherever it finds them, in the interest
of national defense. 8
It is the purpose of this article to attempt to evaluate the decision
historically as well as legally, not entirely forgetting those political
(using that term in its broadest sense) overtones inherent in any
decision of such a far-reaching nature.
Although the expression "tidelands" has been generally used to
describe the area in controversy between the United States and California, the claim was actually not for the tidelands but for a strip
three nautical miles in width stretching seaward from mean low tide.
To put the matter in a proper frame of reference, a brief explanation
is in order, covering: (1) the historical background and present status
of the three-mile limit; and (2) the origins and development of the
present conflict.
A prime necessity for an appreciation of the background of the
present controversy is the varying degree in which political and
property concepts have some bearing on it. The assertion of sover*-Member, Illinois and Wyoming Bars, Assistant Professor of Law, University of
Wyoming, 1945-46.
1. 832 U. S. 19, 67 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1658.
2. The Constitution and the Continental Shelf, by Hardwicke, Illig and Patter-

son in 26 Texas L. R. 398; The Tidelands Question, by E. J. Sullivan in 3
Wyoming L. J. 10.
3. The late Governor Beauford H. Jester of Texas declared that "This national
ownership doctrine could as well be applied to the potash of New Mexico and
Texas; the mercury of California . . . the copper of Utah, Arizona, Montana
and Michigan (ete) . . . " Such a doctrine, the governor thought, "would be

extended to such vital elements as the bread of life--the wheat of Kansas,
Oklahoma, Nebraska; the corn of Iowa ... "
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eignty or dominion over a particular area may or may not connote
assertion of property rights. Thus at one time Spain and Portugal
claimed exclusive rights of navigation over the oceans, according to
an arbitrary division.4 Against such claims was opposed the theory
of the freedom of the seas as common property and open to all ships
of the family of nations. The latter theory, no doubt aided by such
coincidental events as the defeat of the Spanish Armada, prevailed.
The Dutch have always been good seamen and good sea-lawyers.
It was a Dutchman, Bynkershoek, who first proposed the three-mile
limit in 1702.5 Three miles, it appears, was the limit of shore-based
cannon at that period. The basis of the theory, as urged by Bynkershoek, was that the sea was owned to the extent to which the littoral
nation could exclude others from its use. Thus in its inception the
emphasis was on dominion rather than title.6
It may be observed, by way of definition, that the term "marginal
sea" of a state is 'that part of the sea within three (nautical) miles
of its shore measured outward from the mean low water mark or from
the seaward limit of a bay or river mouth."7 The inland waters of a
state are defined as "the waters inside its marginal sea [i.e. landward
of mean low-water mark and of the seaward limit of bays and mouths
of rivers], as well as the waters within its land territory."8 Finally
the expression "tidelands" refers only to lands above low water mark,
whether adjacent to the marginal sea or to inland waters, which are
covered and uncovered by tidal waters. Though widely and loosely
used in reference to the Supreme Court decision and legislation pending in Congress on the subject, there has never been any issue as to
"tidelands" as so defined. The issue, as will be shown, pertains exclusively to rights in the lands under the marginal sea.
4. Such extravagant claims, made in the sixteenth century, led to the "Battle of
the Books" and the eventual emergence of the doctrine of "freedom of the
seas." Actually this simply returned the matter to the concept of the Roman
law that the seas were res communes, common highways for the use of all.
Undoubtedly competition for the wealth of the newly-discovered American
continent had a great deal to do with the assertions of property rights in the
seas. Under such circumstances it could be expected that a scholar who
happened to be a citizen of a nation with great naval power would advocate
the proprietary theory. See Selden, Mare Clausum. As a Dutchman, Grotius
supported the Roman view. See Grotius, Mare Liberum and De Jure Belli
ac Pacis.
5. De Dominio Maris Dissertatio (1702). While not the first, Bynkershoek was
perhaps the most famous publicist of this period to suggest the three-mile
limit or some distance based on cannon range. See Fenn, Origins of the
Theory of Territorial Waters (1926), 20 A.J.I.L. 465. For other standard
wu+ks on the general subject of territorial waters and the marginal sea: Fulton, Sovereignty of the Sea (1911); Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters
and Maritime Jurisdiction (1927).
6. De Dominio Maris Dissertatio, pp. 41-45, 55-57, translated by Magoffin in
Classics of International Law (1923).
7. Ireland: Marginal Seas Around the States. 2 La. L.R. 252, at 268, 270.
8. Ireland: Op. Cit. page 270.
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While the three-mile limit was thus suggested as early as 1702,
it had no official or even unofficial international recognition at the
time of the American Revolution. Its first appearance in American
law was in the form of a letter from Secretary of State Jefferson to
the British Minister under date of November 8, 1793.9 At that time
and for many years later the British Navy made free use of American
territorial waters. By excluding warships from such waters, Jefferson hoped to maintain American neutrality.
Much has been made of the argument that the original thirteen
states became, at the time of the Declaration of Independence, separate sovereignties and as such were vested with the rights and prerogatives of the English Crown in their territory, including submerged
lands in bays and harbors and also the lands below the marginal sea.1O
Under this theory, states subsequently coming into the Union on an
"equal footing", as provided in the various enabling acts, likewise
became vested with title to this submerged land.11 That theory has
already, as noted supra, been subjected to criticism for the. reason
that there was no settled three-mile or any surrounding belt. Moreover, there is grave doubt that the states, as separate entities were
the inheritors of the Crown. Respectable authority suggests that the
prerogatives of the Crown were transferred to the new government
of the United States, however ineffective that government may have
been in some respects.12
The derivative theory can be attacked from still another pointthat of the attitude of the English courts a century after the Declaration of Independence. The question presented was the applicability
of the English criminal laws to a foreigner on a ship in the three-mile
zone.13 The Court of Exchequer held that the laws did not so apply,
Chief Justice Cockburn saying:
"... . To this hour, it (the three-mile limit) has not, even in
theory, settled into certainty. For centuries before it was thought
of, the great landmarks of our judicial system had been set fast
-the jurisdiction of the common law over the land and inland
waters contained within it, forming together the realm of England, that of the admiral over English vessels on the seas, the
common property or highway of mankind."
In that same case, it was argued by way of analogy that a certain
act of Parliament vesting coal mines on the Cornwall coast in Queen
9. Crocker: The Extent of the Marginal Sea (1919) p. 636.
10. E. g. 26 Tex. L.R. 413; Loret: Louisiana's 27-mile Maritime Belt, 2 Tulane

L.R. 253, 257.
11. Act of September 9, 1850. 9 Stat. 452 (California).
12. United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304, 316, 57 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 216, 219, 81 L. Ed. 255.
13. Queen v. Keyn, L.R. 2 Ex. 63 (Ex. 1876).
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Victoria constituted an assertion of the crown's title to the threemile belt. The Court took the contrary view, stating that the Act
merely settled "a dispute as to the specific mines ...in question." In
an able comment in the Yale Law Journal, the situation is summed
up in these words: "The relatively recent appearance of the threemile limit in English law, the distinction between inland and coastal
waters, and the denial of the crown's general title to submerged lands
under coastal waters all negate California's contention that title to
the disputed lands was an incident of royal sovereignty when the original colonists acquired the crown's rights. 14
II
Defenders of the claims of California and the other littoral states
to title to the ocean bed off their coasts make much of American decisions supposedly supporting that position. The strongest decisions
in this regard, however, pertain not to title of marginal sea bed, but
to inland waters.15 In the Pollard case, the U.S. Supreme Court first
advanced the "trust theory" whereby it was held that land under
navigable waters in new territory was held in trust for the states
thereafter carved from such territory, and that such new states, on
admission, became vested with the title theretofore in the United States. This interpretation of the "equal footing" clause of the Constitution has not been modified, but this holding cannot be applied to the
marginal sea, however loosely the courts and writers have bandied
the words "tidelands" and "navigable waters" about.16
Also heavily relied upon by the proponents of the state claims is
the line of cases dealing with the exercise of police power by states
within their inland and marginal waters. Perhaps the most compelling
is that of Manchester v. Massachusetts, but that involved the regulation of fishing in Massachusetts, i.e. inland waters.16a In upholding the
state statute, the Supreme Court expressly disclaimed any intent to
delimit the respective spheres of state and Federal power. The Court
has similarly upheld Florida's control of the sponge fishery in territorial (marginal) waters.17 Florida's sponge-fishing statute again
came before the Court in Skiriotes v. Florida, Chief Justice Hughes
holding for the Court that the statute "so far as applied to conduct
within the territorial waters of Florida, in the absence of conflicting
Federallegislation, is within the police power of the State.18 (Emphasis supplied)" The Chief Justice's saving phrase speaks for itself.
14. 31 Yale L. J. 356, 362.
15. Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 3 How, 212 (U. S. 1845); Martin v. Waddell, 16
Pet. 367, 41 U. S. 367, 10 L. Ed. 997.
16. 31 Yale L.J. 362.
16a. 139 U. S. 240, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 559, 35 L. Ed. 159.
17. The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S.166, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 310, 56 L. Ed. 390.
18. 313 U. S.69, 75, 61Sup. Ct. Rep. 924, 928, 85 L. Ed. 1193.
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BACKGROUND

OF THE PRESENT CONTROVERSY

With the developing oil industry in California, operators, always
searching for new fields, began to drill along the seashore, later on
tidal lands, and finally in the ocean bed below low tide. This development took place in the 1920's. Oil companies devised means of reaching
these underwater pools by various methods, such as slant wells,
"whipstocking" from established upland wells and drilling vertical
wells in the open sea. 1 9 At first this development precipitated a contest between state and local authorities, principally in the Long Beach
area. These strictly intramural battles were interrupted in 1937 by
the Nye bill, introduced by Senator Nye of North Dakota, in which
the United States asserted title in all submerged lands between low
water and the three-mile limit as part of the public domain. This bill
was later changed to a Joint Resolution and, with strong Navy support,
was passed by the Senate on August 19, 1937.20
When the resolution came to the House of Representatives, it ran
into concerted opposition. Apprehension had spread to other littoral
states, particularly those that might have valuable oil deposits within
their marginal seas. The attorneys general of Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas and representatives of various port authorities
now appeared before the House Judiciary Committee. The upshot was
in effect an entirely new resolution, limited to California waters, and
asserting the right of the United States to extract oil in that area
as a naval petroleum reserve. But no action was taken and the whole
matter went over to the next Congress. The pendulum had begun to
swing. The littoral states began making converts, and in 1946, House
Joint Resolution 225 was passed, quitelaiming to the several states
the tidewaters and the lands oceanward "three geographical miles distant from the coast line." The resolution was vetoed by the President.
Meantime President Truman had, in 1945, by proclamation asserted
title in the United States to the entire continental shelf, lying generally westward of our Pacific coast and extending varying distances
up to several hundred miles.21 This shelf is relatively shallow and
under it, presumably, oil structures may be found similar to those existing in the present confines of the North American continent. Obviously, however, the action of the President could not be conclusive
without implementation by the Congress. It was under such circumstances that the matter was submitted to the Supreme Court in the
form of an original suit, asking that the court declare the rights of
the United States in the marginal sea and to enjoin the State of California from trespassing on the area in violation of such rights.
19. See Ireland, Op. Cit. p. 253.
20. Id. p. 257.
21. Pres. Procl. No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303, Sept. 18, 1945.
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THE DECISION IN UNITED STATES VS. CALIFORNIA22
Mr. Justice Black, in delivering the opinion for the Court, held
that California was not the owner of the three-mile marginal belt,
and that the Federal government, rather than the State, has "paramount rights in and power over that belt, an incident to which is full
dominion over the resources of the soil under that water area, including oil."23 There were two dissenting opinions. That of Justice Frankfurter took the view that in claiming "dominion" over marginal sea
bottom for the United States, the Court was necessarily asserting
a proprietary right. Such a right or claim being a matter of policy
should not be a subject of judicial inquiry. Justice Reed took the view
that title to the marginal belt was definitely established in Caifornia.
Justice Black rejected the assertion of original sovereignty in
the marginal sea at the time of the Revolution, pointing out with sound
logic that: "At the time this country won its independence from
England there was no settled international custom or understanding
among nations that each nation owned a three-mile water belt." After
thus disposing of the derivative theory so strongly pressed by California, the court observes that: "The three-mile rule is but a recognition of the necessity that a government next to the sea must protect
itself from dangers inherent in its location."24 In disposing of the
"trust theory" and "police power" line of decisions, the court correctly pointed out that the former were not applicable to the marginal
sea and that the latter did not purport to read into the state's jurisdiction or regulatory power a "dominion" over the sea bottom.25
At this point the court had without doubt demonstrated a complete lack of title in the ocean bed so far as the littoral states are concerned. But here the real difficulty emerges: how to slide over from
lack of title in the state to title in the Federal government? The able,
unnamed commentator in the Yale Law Journal had boldly suggested
that as the acquisition of new land is "only within the power of the
national sovereign and not of the states ... the Court could therefore
consider the Presidential Proclamation as for the first time vesting
title to the whole continental shelf, including that portion within
the three-mile limit, in the Federal Government." 2 6 But the Court
chose to base its decision not on title but on the "paramount rights"
of the United States in and to the coastal belt, including the right to
extract oil therefrom.
22. See Note 1.
23.
24.
25.
26.

332 U. S. 38,
332 U. S. 35,
332 U. S.36,
31 Yale L.J.

39, 67 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1668.
67 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1666.
38, 39, 67 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1667, 1668.
369.
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Considerable alarm has been expressed in some quarters over
what is called "something novel in our law"27 and "a startlingly new
and alarming concept of property rights."2s These critics and other
foresaw eventual assertion of Federal "paramount" powers whenever and wherever resources within state boundaries were needed for
national security. By this rather hurried leaping at a conclusion the
littoral states were able to persuade the attorneys general of all the
public lands states except Montana that they should oppose the Federal claim of marginal sea lands.29
In holding that the United States had paramount rights in the
marginal sea lands and that a necessary incident of such paramount
rights was the right to extract mineral resources, including oil, therefrom, Mr. Justice Black was dealing with two rather volatile legal
substances: (1) the nature of the "sovereignty" of the United States
as that applied to its dealing with foreign nations, or, as sometimes
called, "external sovereignty"; and (2) the separability or perhaps
"stratification" of property rights. That both these elements were
necessary in the opinion is the proposition that remains to be demonstrated.
1. The first proposition depends to a large extent, if not altogether, on a remarkable opinion by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.8O The case dealt with the powers of the president to prohibit arms traffic to the belligerents in the
Grand Chaco conflict in South America. Acting under very broad
powers contained in a resolution of Congress, the President had made
a proclamation making it unlawful to sell arms to the countries involved. In a prosecution for violation of the presidential order, the
contention was made on appeal from a conviction for selling machine
guns to Bolivia that the resolution constituted an unlawful delegation
of power. While rejecting that contention, the Court took occasion to
discuss extensively the general subject of the powers of the president
in international affairs. Noting that the grant to the Federal Government in the Constitution was of such powers as the several states
possessed at the time of its adoption, Justice Sutherland observed:
"During the colonial period those (sovereign) powers were possessed exclusively by and were entirely under the control of the
Crown. By the Declaration of Independence, 'the Representatives
of the United States of America' declared the United [not the
several] Colonies to be free and independent states, and as such
to have 'full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alli27. 26 Tex. L.R. 405.
28. 3 Wyo. L.J. 10.
29. This was accomplished, perhaps, by conjuring up fears of Federal encroachment on western oil lands. See note 3, supra.
30. See Note 12, supra.
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ances, establish Commerce and to do all other Acts and Things
which Independent States may of right do."31
The Court then states upon the separation from Great Britain the
"powers of external sovereignty passed from the Crown not to the
colonies severally but the colonies in their collective and corporate
capacity as the United States of America." The Court reasons that,
as stated, the powers of external sovereignty, including the power to
wage war, conclude peace and make treaties, "if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the Federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality."S2 If this were not
so, the United States would not be completely sovereign. One of those
powers expressly mentioned by the court is the power to acquire territory by discovery and occupation, citing Jones v. United States.33
Justice Black notes that "as a member of the family of nations"
the rights of this country in the international field are equal to those
possessed by other nations. But how does this apply to the submerged
lands off the coasts? With the Pollard line of cases disposed of on
the ground that they were limited to inland waters, there remains the
delicate point of the assumption of title or dominion over the submerged marginal lands. This brings us to the heart of the matter.
Grant the assertion of "jurisdiction" by the states as to sponge
and other fisheries in those waters. Grant the existence of a threemile limit around the coasts. The question still remains: What is the
status of the ocean-bed? Certainly there is no title in the states. Does
it then follow that it must be in the United States? It has not been
so contended except by the plaintiff in this action. Historically, the
three-mile limit had nothing whatsoever to do with claims of rights
in the ocean-bed. The purpose, since Bynkershoek, had been to protect the coasts of the state, to protect the nation's sovereignty. The
claims of the states of the union, no more than those of the original
colonies, cannot rise above the source. The whole dictrine of freedom of the seas is based on the concept that the seas belong to none,
but are the common highway of all.
At this point the Court reasons from the vast inherent powers of
the sovereign in foreign affairs directly to the assertion of the paramount right to extract minerals from the submerged coastal lands.
As such, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that the United
States has the power to acquire these minerals as a part of the general
sovereignty which gives a legal basis for acquisition of new land,
whether by purchase, war, cession or conquest.
31. 290 U. S. 316.
32. 290 U. S. 318.
33. 137 U. S. 202, 212, 34 L. Ed. 691, 694.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MARGINAL SEA

2. The second proposition facing the court was what was called
the "stratification" of property rights. In the course of argument before the court, Justice Black remarked:
"Well, I don't know that it has been held that the oil goes with
the soil. Suppose they discovered something about four miles
under the surface of the earth. Do you mean that the old property
concept would have to apply to that, even though it were something the Government desperately needed ?"
Mr. Justice Frankfurter asked: "Why can't you recognize title as to
oyster beds but not title as to oil wells?
Mr. Daniel: Because the title goes with the ownership of the soil.
Justice Frankfurter: You could have different layers of title,
this layer belongs to the state, this to the Government, because it
is oil."34
While this "layer" theory appeared startling to Mr. Daniel of Texas,
it is no novelty in the law. On the contrary it has been repeatedly
recognized. A fairly recent case is that of Ohio Oil Co. v. Wyoming
Agency.35 There, the owner of the mineral fee asserted title by reason
of a sheriff's deed issued on a sale after judgment and execution on
an irrigation assessment. The court held that as the mineral fee had
been conveyed, i.e. "severed" prior to the assessment in question, the
sheriff's deed did not convey any interest in the minerals. In this instance the severance was effected by a reservation in a deed and was
valid though no extraction of minerals had been made and no assessment had ever been made against the mineral fee. As the court said:
"After severance, the two estates, owned separately, are held
by separate and distinct titles. This has been emphasized in the
cases. It has been said that the two estates are 'as distinct as if
they had constituted two parcels of land.' It is not material that
the plane by which the properties are separated is horizontal instead of vertical.36
There is obviously no question of severance as far as the oil-bearing
lands offshore are concerned. The point is, however, that the common
source for any and all claims to any part of the marginal sea is the
assertion of the soverign's right to this area as a matter of national
defense. "The three mile rule is," as Justice Black states, "but a recognition of the necessity that a government next to the sea must be able
to protect itself from dangers inherent to its location." To build upon
this concept born of necessity a framework of title and "sovereignty"
in the several states would be legally anomalous. The structure would
34. 3 Wyo. L.J. 16.
35. -

Wyo. -,

179 P. (2d) 773.

36. 179 P. (2d) 778.
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be without foundation. Neither precedent nor common sense will permit us to slide from "jurisdiction" for national defense to "title." The
states' right contenders, however, are not content to stop there. They
boldly claim title in the ocean-bed to whatever distance from the shore
line eager legislators may deem reasonable (and potentially profitable) .37 Even more disturbing is the assumption that the states' claim
to the three-mile belt is sound basis for state ownership of the entire
continental shelf, to whatever extent it may reach.88 Professor Borchard, representing the oil industry before a special Senate Committee
investigating petroleum resources in 1945, stated as follows:
The Chairman (Mr. O'Mahoney). So your argument is that, regardless of modern improvements, the greater distance to which
we extend the ability of men to prospect and recover valuable
minerals or substances from the subsoil under the sea, the greater
we extend the jurisdiction of the riparian states, to the disadvantage of the states of the interior?
Mr. Borchard. Yes, sir, that would necessarily follow from geographical considerations. The only question is who, as between
the Federal Government and the States, has the prior claim."39
In his testimony, Professor Borchard expressed the thought that
it would be almost insuperably difficult to separate state and Federal
claims, if the state's claims were deemed to reach no farther than the
three-mile limit. He therefore would, as a "practical" solution, sustain
the claim of the states to the continental shelf, however distant from
the coast, while finding manifold difficulties in demarcating the lines
of ownership. In advancing his somewhat startling theory that the
littoral states could stake out claims far in excess of those then asserted by the United States, he remarked that if oil were discovered
beyond the three-mile limit, "the states would undoubtedly claim them
(the lands), and then the states could use prescription and occupation
as sufficient theoretical justification for continuing the claim."4o
While convenient for his clients, the professor's theory of prescription
cheerfully ignores the fact that there is no power in the states to
acquire territory not previously a part of the United States.

37. 26 Tex. L.R. 438, 439; Loret: 13 Tulane L. R. 257. Contra: Ireland: 2 La. L.R.
275.

38. 26 Tex. L.R. 438, 439.

39. Hearings before Special Committee Investigating Petroleum Resources (79th
Congress).

Page 133.

40. Id. page 129.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE MARGINAL SEA

CONCLUSION
Though the three-mile limit historically originated in 1702, it was
not recognized generally at the time of the American Revolution.
There is then no basis for the derivative theory, weakened as it is by
the plausible and more modern theory that at the Declaration of
Independence the sovereign powers formerly exercised by the British
Crown passed to the United States as an entity. Under such circumstances the source of any "title" to the ocean bed below low tide could
only derive from the successful assertion of a three-mile limit by the
sovereign, i.e. the United States.
The California decision is debatable only to the extent that it
asserts the Federal right to paramount jurisdiction rather than title
in the United States. Perhaps the Court was reluctant to go that far
in the absence of Congressional action, or perhaps it felt that the
question of title could be passed over, inasmuch as the matter actually
at stake was the right to extract minerals. Here again the Court may
be on solid historical ground, for as the assertion of jurisdiction over
the three-mile limit had arisen solely from considerations of national
defense, and so was not primarily concerned with the bed of the sea,
the right to extract oil, stemming from exactly the same considerations, should be similarly limited.
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ADDENDUM
Since the foregoing article was prepared, the Supreme Court has
handed down decisions involving the claims of the United States to
paramount rights in the offshore minerals in the Gulf of Mexico
claimed by Louisiana and Texas.) In both, the Court followed the
reasoning and holding of the California decision. Analysis of these
decisions is beyond the scope of this article, but two points of interest
may be mentioned: (a) The United States made claim against Louisiana to the ownership of, or paramount rights over, the lands extending seaward twenty-seven marine miles from the ordinary lowwater mark; (b) the state of Texas raised the contention that its
unquestioned sovereignty prior to admission and its reservation, at
the time of admission, of "all the vacant and unappropriated lands
lying within its limits" required a different decision in its case.
1. Louisiana. The rationale of the California case is that the
three-mile limit had its origin as a manifestation of sovereignty, and
that being so, the state's claim of ownership would fall. How, then,
can the United States lay claim to a 27-mile strip, without in effect
conceding that Louisiana has extended the seaward pretensions of the
national authority that far?2 The Court answered this difficulty by
stating that the boundaries of states were not involved. If the threeit follows, a fortiori,
.
mile belt is within the national domain, " ..
that the ocean beyond that limit also is. The ocean seaward of the
marginal belt is perhaps even more directly related to the national
defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and world commerce than is
the marginal sea . . . "3 This reasoning leaves something to be desired. It would seem a sounder approach to meet the boundary question head-on, pointing out that states have no carte blanche to extend
their boundaries seaward.
2. Texas. From March 2, 1836 to March 1, 1845, Texas was
an independent nation, fully recognized as such by the United States.
Aside from the exact meaning of the reservation of "vacant and unappropriated lands," would its prior independence have any bearing
on the matter of the rights in the three-mile limit? The Court decided against Texas on the ground that it entered the Union on "an
equal footing" with the other states. Obviously, no modicum of severeignty in the sense of control over foreign relations, national de4
fense and foreign commerce remained in the state.

1. United States vs. State of Louisiana, 340 U. S.-, 70 Sup. Ct. Rep. 914; United
States vs. State of Texas, 340 U. S.-, 70 Sup. Ct. Rep. 918.
2. By act of the Legislature, Louisiana extended its boundary seaward to 27
marine miles. La. Act 55 of 1938 (Dart's Stats. 1939, Secs. 9311.1-9311.4).

3. 70 Sup. Ct. Rep. 917.
4. 70 Sup. Ct. Rep. 923.

